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Effects of Sole Gift of Proceeds With No
Disposition of Corpus
by Phillip H. Marshall*
F EVERY TESTATOR were disposed to cause his manifest testa-
torial intent to be clearly outlined in his last will and testa-
ment, the task of the courts would be to that degree less burden-
some. For the courts are called upon to construe and finally
decide the rights of conflicting interests which usually arise from
a will which does not "legally" import the testator's true intent.
Thus, the end result is that it is the court's opinion of what the
testator actually intended, which may or may not coincide with
the testator's testamentary desire. This situation usually arises
where the testator, for one reason or another, deems himself
capable of drawing his own will and using the requisite legal
language which the courts will recognize and give effect to.
It may be readily observed that the problems created by an
ambiguous will become proportionately more complex as the
value and various types of assets of an estate increase. Included
in the aforesaid complexities is the devise of land due to the
technicalities which necessarily accompany a valid conveyance
of this type of asset. Adding to these pre-existing problems, the
testator in certain instances creates new legal questions through
his failure to clearly designate the party that is to receive the land
and the type of legal estate that the devisee is to hold therein.
It is with this last mentioned problem that the balance of this
article will concern itself.
What is the effect of an absolute devise of "proceeds" or
"income" of the corpus of an estate where, under a general
devise, words clearly importing the creation of a fee simple estate
as to the corpus are lacking and there is no express or implied
power of sale? More particularly we shall consider the above
in the following circumstances:
(1) When in the will there is contained an absolute gift of
"proceeds" of the corpus;
(2) A gift of "proceeds" of the corpus followed by limitation
upon the corpus; and
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(3) Where under a bequest of "proceeds" along with cre-
ation of a testamentary trust and limitations over upon corpus
of the estate.
At this point it might be well to state that the words; pro-
ceeds, income, rents, profits are used interchangeably, through-
out this article primarily because the courts have not placed any
particular significance on any one term but have used them as a
class to convey the idea that there is a recurrent benefit pro-
ceeding from the ownership of property' (or a corpus).
(1) Bare Gift of Proceeds.
In connection with the first class mentioned above, we might
consider the question involved in Armina D. Isherwood v. Libbie
M. Isherwood, 16 Ohio Circuit Court Reports 279,2 in which the
first paragraph of the syllabus reads as follows:
"Devise of the proceeds of all testator's real estate, equiva-
lent to devise of the real estate itself . . ."
The plaintiff, Armina D. Isherwood, filed her petition to quiet
title on the 7th of June, 1894, stating that she was the owner in
fee simple and possession of certain real estate described in the
petition and that the defendant claimed the said real estate ad-
verse to her rights. The controversy appears to have arisen from
the provision in the will of the plaintiff's husband of which the
significant sections read as follows:
"2. I hereby give and bequeath to my (adopted) daughter
Libbie Maria Isherwood the sum of ten thousand dollars to
be paid by my executors out of my estate in installments as
my executors may think best or situation of circumstances
may require.
3. I hereby give and devise to my dear wife Armina D.
Isherwood in lieu of dower in my real estate and in full of
all rights of any kind in my personal and real estate, all of
my personal estate of any kind remaining after payment of
my just debts and funeral expenses and the bequest of ten
thousand dollars to my daughter Libbie Maria Isherwood,
and also the proceeds of my real estate."
Prior to this action the executor appointed under the fore-
going will brought an action to construe the will, which action
could have only been maintained if a trust was created by the
terms thereof. It was held that no trust was established for the
1 Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 790.
2 Decision affirmed without opinion in 57 Ohio St. 660, 50 N. E. 1130.
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lack of directions in relation to the land, the will containing no
residuary clause or any other disposition of the real estate.
The court cites here Collier v. Grimesey, 36 Ohio St., 17 as
determining the issues presented for opinion and at page 21
states:
"We do not question (says Judge White, J., in delivering
the opinion) that a devise of 'rents and profits' or of 'profits
or benefits' of lands, without qualification or limitation will
impliedly carry the fee. But in order to determine whether
there is such qualification or limitation, we must look into
the whole will, with the view of ascertaining the sense in
which the terms were used by the testator; and when such
sense is ascertained, to give it the effect intended. Such terms
cannot be held to carry the fee when it appears from other
parts of the will that the fee is otherwise disposed of."
The court further states that the primary issue to be resolved
is the actual intention of the testator when he used the terms,
"proceeds of my real estate." Everything that the testator pos-
sessed at his death both real and personal was disposed of ac-
cording to the terms of the will. The language used in the dis-
position to the wife in Item 3 of the will according to the opinion
of the court was tantamount to a devise of the corpus of the real
estate when considered in the light of the decision in Collier v.
Grimesey, supra.
The court also cites Davis v. Williams, 8[5] Tenn. 6463 where
the court declared:
"A devise of rents, and profits, or income of land operates
as a devise of the land itself; and if limited to the deviser's
life, vests in him a life estate into land, but if unlimited, it
vests in him an absolute fee simple title to the land, without
the use of the term 'heirs' or other words of inheritance . . ."
Thus it was held that a gift of proceeds alone was sufficient
to pass the fee in the corpus in the absence of a subsequent
definite limitation over.
(2) Gift of Proceeds With a Prohibition Against Alienation.
In relation to the second category, gift of "proceeds" of the
corpus followed by a limitation thereon, was construed sufficient
to pass the fee thereto, notwithstanding a subsequent clause
prohibiting alienation. We might now consider issues involved
in Minor v. Shippley, et al., 21 Ohio App. 236 in which a quiet
3 Reported in 4 S. W. 8.
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title action came to the appellate court from the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Licking County. From the agreed statement of
facts John Eugart died testate in 1853 leaving Anna and Maria
Eugart, wife and daughter respectively, as survivors. Portions
of his controversial will read as follows:
"Item 2. I give to my wife, Anna, all the proceeds of my
farm on which I now reside in Licking County, Ohio, until
my daughter shall arrive at the age of eighteen years.
Item 3. When my said daughter shall arrive at the age of
eighteen years then she shall have Y4th the proceeds of the
farm, my wife 1/4th so long as she remains my wife, and the
remainder shall go to the Preachers' Aid Society of the
Methodist Protestant Church and the Muskingum Annual
Conference.
Item 4. At the death of my said daughter, I give the
whole of said proceeds of said farm to the Preachers' Aid
Society, but said Society are not to sell the farm."
After Maria came into possession of the farm subsequent to
the death of her mother, the Preachers' Aid Society in 1893
started court proceedings to have a receiver take charge of the
farm, put it in repair, and divide the proceeds thereof between
said Aid Society and the daughter. Judgment was rendered
for the defendant and the Aid Society was ordered to convey
their interest on the farm by quit claim deed to the defendant.
The issue as stated was that if the plaintiff acquired title
by purchase, then she was entitled to have her title quieted-
if by devise or descent the plaintiff had only a life estate therein.
More particularly the decision was dependent upon the determi-
nation of the question as to whether the Aid Society, when de-
vised the "proceeds" of the farm at the death of Maria Minor,
thereby acquired a remainder in fee and when subsequently or-
dered to convey their interest to the plaintiff herein she acquired
that interest by purchase and held a fee simple estate in the en-
tire farm.
The court held that based upon the devise of "proceeds" the
Aid Society acquired a remainder in fee, when ordered to convey
their interest to Maria Minor she acquired her title by purchase
and was permitted to have her title quieted.
The contention of the defendant that the words, "I give the
whole of said proceeds of said farm," are not sufficient to vest
absolute title to same is untenable, notwithstanding the subse-
quent limitation upon the devise "but said Society are not to sell
the farm." For the court states that "the rule in Ohio is to the
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol5/iss1/9
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contrary viz., that such words are sufficient to transfer the fee.
The general and fixed rule of construction is: that a gift of income
of real estate is a gift of the real estate itself, and a gift of the
perpetual or unrestrained income is a gift of the fee."
Based upon the above rule the court held that once a fee
was created in the first taker, and a subsequent clause attempt-
ing to limit that fee was repugnant to the prior grant and there-
fore must be eliminated as an indicator of intent when the court
construed the will.
This court also cites Collier v. Grimesey, supra, in support of
their decision that "the gift of proceeds, without an effective
qualification is sufficient to pass a fee simple absolute estate to
the corpus."
(3) Gift of Proceeds Along With the Creation of a Testamentary
Trust Gift Over of the Corpus.
Finally, in category No. 3 we find a case which contains a
gift of income to the first taker along with a creation of a testa-
mentary trust and a gift over of the corpus. The court here found
that the first devise of income gave absolute title to the income
only. The gift over was in this case held valid, because the
phrases throughout the will would not lend themselves to any
other construction but the establishment of life estate in the first
takers.
In Smith v. Robbins, et al., 72 Ohio St. 1, the two surviving
daughters of the testator, now 59 and 70 years of age respectively,
were beneficiaries of a trust created by the will in question which
held shares of stock in a chemical company and several parcels
of real estate. The annual income from the stock alone was
$13,453.00 to each beneficiary. The beneficiaries as plaintiffs
sought to have it decreed that they each owned in fee simple
absolute, a one-third interest in the corpus of the estate (both
stock and the real property). Also to have it adjudged that the
purpose of the trust being subserved that it was terminated (the
testamentary trust having been operative for a long period), and
possession of the respective shares of the corpus be delivered
immediately.
With the limited factual situation sketched in we might set
out of the controversial portions of the will in question, which are
are follows:
"FIRST: I give devise and bequeath to my dear wife,
Julia Anna Harwood, the third part of my estate of every
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1956
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kind, whether consisting of real estate, money, debts, mer-
chandise, furniture, or whatever description and character
said property may be.
SECOND: The remaining two-thirds of my estate shall
be equally apportioned amongst my children, but shall not be
paid over to them but shall be invested in their behalf, and
the annual income arising to each child shall be subject to
her control, whether married or unmarried in no instance
shall the husband of any such child have any power or
control over the principal or interest of said share; never-
theless, each of my children shall have full power and au-
thority to will and devise her portion of said inheritance in
such manner as she sees fit.
THIRD: In case either dying without leaving a will her
portion is to be equally divided between her children who
may survive her or if she have no children surviving her
said portion shall be paid to my children who may survive
her share and share alike."
The major question to be resolved is was it the true intent
of the testator to create a fee simple estate in the corpus of the
estate in the daughters? The answer to this question necessarily
depends upon the construction the court desired to give to the
words which made up the will. Such phrases in the second item
of the will as:
(1) "to be apportioned amongst my children,"
(2) "annual income arising to each shall be subject to her
control,"
(3) "each of my children shall have the full power to devise
her portion of said inheritance," and
(4) the phrase which prohibited the husband from sharing
in the corpus or proceeds of the estate. The above phrases might
tend to, when considered apart from the will in its entirety,
create a question as to whether the testator contemplated an
immediate vesting of the fee in his children or not.
In answer to the questions created by the will as to the
type estate the first takers were possessed of, the court held that
under the will the children took an absolute title to the income
but only an estate for life in the corpus of the estate, with the
power in each to finally dispose by will of her portion devised
for her benefit and with a remainder in the children surviving
such child and failing these in the surviving child of the testator
in case the corpus should not have been disposed of by will.
That, also, the mere grant of control of the annual income to the
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol5/iss1/9
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testator's children did not give the devisees under the will an
absolute fee in the corpus of the estate but only a life interest
therein.
The court appears to have taken the position that had the
testator desired an immediate vesting of the corpus he would have
intimated this desire in more emphatic terms than merely
stating "her portion of the inheritance" or in granting to the
beneficiaries income of investment "subject to her control." In
fact the testator made an executory devise of the corpus separate
and apart from the income which would further support the view
that no immediate vesting of a fee was contemplated by the
testator.
In the courts' discussion of the will they state that there was
no operative sentence giving or indicating a purpose to give an
absolute estate as to the principal. The phrase "her portion of
the inheritance" indicates an absolute fee but the court states
that that portion was only a life estate when effect was given
to the will as a whole. Also, that the expressed purpose of the
will was to make such provision for these daughters as would
insure as far as humanly possible a permanent income during
their lives "freed from the risks and vicissitudes incident to the
management of valuable property by ladies who, it is reasonable
to assume, were unaccustomed to such responsibility. . . ." That
it was the "income" alone that was the subject of the devise
to the plaintiff as distinguished from the disposition of the corpus
which the testator made an additional provision.
Finally, Baxter v. Boyer, 19 Ohio St. 490, and Johnson v.
Johnson, 51 Ohio St. 446 were cited by the court to support their
application of the rule that where real property is devised or
bequeathed by words prima facie (giving control of the income
in the present case) importing an absolute estate and by subse-
quent clause in remainder to another, the first taker takes only
a life estate and limitation over is valid.
The general rule of construction as stated in Baxter v.
Boyer, supra, is
"that conflicting provisions of a will should be reconciled so
as to conform to the manifest general intent and it is only
in cases where such provisions are wholly and absolutely
repugnant that either should be rejected . . . giving effect
to this principle the general intent and paramount purpose
of the will can be easily carried out."
However, the courts are limited to the extent that they can
not "give a construction to the words which would not import
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1956
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their proper meaning." 4 With the use of these general rules of
construction the courts are usually enabled to determine the
testator's actual intent when they are reviewing an ambiguous
will of the nature outlined above. Thus a fee simple absolute
estate can be created even though the requisite legal terminology
has not been employed by the testator. Through a series of
decisions which have given effect to the manifest intent although
not clearly defined by the testator, the common law in Ohio
appears to be that an absolute gift of income of a corpus is
realty, the absence of anything to indicate a contrary intention,
passes the realty.5 What is the basis for this rule?
One line of reasoning could be that when the testator has
given the first taker the equitable title or beneficial use of the
corpus without an effective limitation thereon he has given the
donee in reality an equitable fee. There being no reason to with-
hold legal title from the holder of the entire equitable title, legal
title should be merged into the equitable title and the first taker
be construed to hold a fee simple absolute under the will.
6
Has the testator given the entire equitable title to the corpus
when he makes a gift of proceeds, income or the like? This ques-
tion necessarily depends upon the intent of the testator as mani-
fested in his testamentary disposition. For if any effective limi-
tation has been placed thereon an equitable life estate may have
been intended by the testator.
In addition to the foregoing, the basis may also center upon
the general principle that the courts endeavor to ascertain and
enforce the intention of the testator, whether expressed in tech-
nical language or not. This is found in the rule that any words,
no matter how informal, which clearly show the testator's inten-
tion to dispose of the entire estate, will pass such estate, even
though the description of the property may be very informal and
lacking in technical accuracy. This result is also reached on the
theory that a partial intestacy is to be avoided where the con-
struction warrants it. The latter principle must always be bal-
anced against the tendency to hold that an heir can only be dis-
inherited by express words.
7
4 19 Ohio St. 490, 37 Ohio Op. 312 (1869).
5 3 Page on Wills (2nd ed. 1926), Sec. 961, p. 40, W. H. Anderson Co.,
Cirm., Ohio.
6 "Select Cases & Other Authorities on the Law of Trusts," p. 743, Scott
(4th ed. 1951), Langdell Hall, Cambridge, Mass.
7 3 Page on Wills (2nd ed. 1926), Sec. 942, pp. 3, 4, W. H. Anderson Co.,
Cinn., Ohio.
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However, the major question for determination is, whether an
effective qualification or limitation has been placed upon the gift
of proceeds to such an extent so as to intimate to the court that
the first taker was not intended to have complete dominion and
control over both the proceeds and the corpus. What then may
be considered to be an effective limitation?
The court may take into consideration the fact that a testator
appointed a trustee which would indicate that he did not intend
to pass the complete ownership in the property by a gift of the
income.s Also when a gift of income is followed by a gift over
of the corpus such gifts'show that the gift of income was not to
vest a fee in the property.9 Thus when the gift of income fails
to pass a fee to the land, a lesser estate (usually a life estate)
may be construed, or the corpus may immediately revert to the
estate of the testator to be distributed according to the statutes
governing intestate succession. The above limitations were
plainly existent in the will under consideration in Smith v. Rob-
bins which, in light of the foregoing, was decided correctly. How-
ever, by way of comparison, was prohibition against alienation
contained in the controversial will of John Eugart in Minor v.
Shippley a valid limitation as would indicate that a fee was not
intended? Here I believe the question becomes narrowed.
It appears that the court might have over-emphasized the
effect of a gift of income. Further, it appears that the construc-
tion given to the will is questionable, if basd solely upon intent
rather than upon a rule adopted by the court to meet the ex-
igencies created by the testator's use of words that had "no
legal significance." For the testator could have contemplated a
reversion or other effective limitation in the event that the So-
ciety did sell the farm when he included his restrictive clause.10
In brief, the general rule that a gift or bequest of proceeds is
sufficient to pass a fee in the absence of an effective limitation
thereon, has become a judicial principle of law in the interpre-
tation of wills. However, "words are to have that force which
authority gives them, unless the contrary is clear." This rule of
8 3 Page on Wills (2nd ed. 1926), Sec. 961, pp. 41, 42, W. H. Anderson Co.,
Cinn., Ohio.
9 Ibid.
10 19 Ohio St. 490 (1869). At page 495, "* * * it must first be well ascer-
tained that the will in question when construed fairly, and in light of all
its provisions and surroundings gives an estate in fee." Also, "If he (testa-
tor) supposed he had already made her the absolute owner, why make
any provision as to manner of using or possessing it?"
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construction is further supported by Section 2107.51 of the Ohio
Revised Code which reads:
When whole estate to pass.
Every devise of lands, tenements, or hereditaments in a
will shall convey all the estate of the devisor therein, unless
it clearly appears by the will that the devisor intended to
convey a less estate.
In Isherwood v. Isherwood the bare gift of "proceeds" was
held sufficient to pass the fee, there not being an attempt to place
a limitation upon the donee's gift of income.
It therefore appears to be a matter bf weighting the contro-
versial phrases of the will-one against the other and in their
relation to the intent of the entire will when the court seeks to
ascertain the manifest intention of the testator. It follows that it
would be impractical to state any exact rule as to nature of an
estate created whenever a particular word or phrase such as
"proceeds" is used by the testator. Although these same words
and phrases may re-appear frequently in numerous wills, the
general surrounding intent will vary with each controversial
instrument, for the term as used must be modified by the sur-
rounding intent.1 Therefore, when the three cases previously
set forth are considered in connection with the general rules of
construction as to proceeds, the decisions appear with possibly
the exception of Minor v. Shippley, to have been logically de-
rived.
11 37 Ohio Op. 312. At page 314, "It is not generally profitable to place
too much reliance on previously decided cases (regarding wills), because
scarcely any two instruments present language precisely alike .... "
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